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A correlation analysis of the severity and certainty of punish-
ment and offense rates for the major index crimes produces 
results consistent with the predictions of deterrence theory. 
Certainty of punishment proves to be the chief deterrent for 
most crimes. Homicide, however, is influenced by severity, pos-
sibly reflecting the differences between homicide and other of-
fenses. Little evidence of interaction is found between certainty 
and severity in effects on crime rate. A power function proves to 
better describe the relationship between the punishment varia-
bles and crime rates than a rectilinear equation-a conclusion 
which, even apart from the date, appears more reasonable than 
the reverse. 
T HE ROLE OF PUNISHMENT in social control remains a topic of dis-
cussion in the popular (Bazelon, 
1960; Menninger, 1968; Clark, 1969; 
Wilson, 1973) and sociological litera-
ture (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; 
Thorsell and Klemke, 1972; Waldo 
and Chiricos, 1972; Bailey and Smith, 
1972; Ehrlich, 1972; Zimring, 1971; 
Bed au, 1970, 1971; Chiricos and 
Waldo, 1970; Jensen, 1969; Tittle, 
1969; Ball, 1969; Gibbs, 1968; Camp-
bell and Ross, 1968; van den Haag, 
1968; Zimring and Hawkins, 1968; 
Chambliss, 1966, 1967). In fact, the 
efficacy of the death penalty in deter-
ring capital offenses continues as one 
of the liveliest debates of the century 
(Bailey, 1973). Philosophers, theo-
logians, legislators, and social scien-
tists have joined in the deterrence 
controversy.! Opinions on this issue 
I. Discussions of deterrence are typically divided into two areas of concern: special deter-
rence and general deterrence. Special deterrence is concerned with reactions that the threat 
of punishment produces among those who have been previously punished and who, for that 
reason, may react to threats differently from the rest of the population. General deterrence 
concerns the response the threat of punishment produces among persons who have not been 
previously punished (Zimring, 1971). The concern of this paper is with the latter type of 
deterrence. For an excellent review of deterrence theory and the distinction between special 
and general deterrence, see Ball (1955), Andenaes (1966), and Zimring (1971). 
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seem highly polarized. In the classical 
criminological tradition, proponents 
argue the absolute necessity of puni-
tive sanctions to deter potential law-
breakers. Some even go so far as to 
suggest that punishment and the fear 
of punishment are the solution to the 
entire crime problem. Witness, for 
example, a statement by one of the 
country's leading police officials in 
addressing the police's understanding 
of the crime problem: 
They alone know the answer to the 
crime problem. That answer can be 
summed up in one sentence-adequate 
detection, swift apprehension, and certain, 
unrelenting punishment. That is what 
the criminal fears. That is what he under-
stands, and nothing else, and that fear i~ 
the only thing which will force him into 
the ranks of the law-abiding (Hoover, 
1936). 
At the other extreme there are those 
who see no hope whatsoever of pun-
ishing people into conformity. Posi-
tivist criminologists have been most 
vocal in this respect. They argue that 
an examination of the history of pun-
ishment clearly reveals its ineffective-
ness in controlling crime. Barnes and 
Teeters, for example, state: 
Not a single assumption underlying the 
theory of capital punishment can be 
squared with the facts about human 
nature and social conduct that have been 
established through the progress of science 
and sociological thought in the last cen-
tury and a half. In fact the whole concept 
of capital punishment is scientifically and 
historically on a par with astrological 
medicine, the belief in witchcraft or the 
rejection of biological evolution (1951, 
355). 
Despite this evidence, they add, we 
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continue to punish wrongdoers. Clear-
ly, deterrence explanations of punish-
ment are but "rationalizations of 
revenge." No other justification is 
possible (Barnes and Teeters, 1951).2 
Unfortunately, much of the deter-
rence debate has been of a philosophi-
cal or moral nature (Gibbs, 1968; 
Puttkammer, 1953). Many have had 
much to say on this issue, but few pro-
vide any evidence to support their 
positions. "Moreover, much of the 
evidence usually cited is inadequate 
or inappropriate to the question at 
issue" (Tittle, 1969, 41 0) and would 
appear to have been collected for the 
sole purpose of disproving the deter-
rent value claimed for punishment 
(McClellan, 1961; Royal Commission 
on Capital Punishment [1949-1953], 
1955). 
In sum, despite the length and in-
tensity of the deterrence controversy, 
the role of punishment in deterring 
crime remains obscure (Zimring and 
Hawkins, 1973). This is an alarming 
situation when considering that the 
presumed effect of punishment pro-
vides the foundation of our criminal 
justice system. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Most deterrence research of the past 
few decades has focused upon the re-
lationship between homicide and capi-
tal punishment (Sellin, 1955, 1967; 
Savitz, 1958; Schuessler, 1952; Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment 
[I 949-1953], 1955). Investigations in 
this area have been of two sorts. First, 
historical analyses have been con-
ducted comparing the incidence of 
homicide before and after the aboli-
2. Equally negative, but less flamboyant, conclusions about punishment as a deterrent to 
crime may be readily found in more recent criminology texts as well. See, for example, 
Reckless (1973, 355), "it (punishment) does not prevent crime in others or prevent relapse 
into crime." 
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tion or enactment of capital punish-
ment. On an international scale such 
investigations have usually concluded 
that homicide rates and the death 
penalty are independent of one an-
other (Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-1953], 1955; Schuess-
ler, 1952). Sellin's longitudinal in-
vestigation of states in this country 
led him to a similar conclusion: "There 
is no clear evidence in any of the 
figures we have examined that the 
abolition of capital punishment has 
led to an increase in the homicide 
rate, or that its reintroduction has led 
to its fall" (1961, 70). 
The second major source of evi-
dence relating capital punishment and 
homicide has come from comparisons 
of abolitionist and capital punish-
ment states' murder rates. These com-
parisons have revealed that the rate 
of homicide is about two to three 
times higher in capital punishment 
than abolitionist states (Sutherland 
and Cressey, 1970; Schuessler, 1952). 
This is clearly contrary to what deter-
rence theory would predict. Some have 
argued, however, that such compari-
sons are invalid, for the grouping of 
these two types of states is not uniform 
with respect to possible important 
etiological factors; i.e., population 
composition, social structure, and cul-
tural patterns. To meet this objection, 
Schuessler (1952) compared the homi-
cide rates of capital punishment states 
with their contiguous abolitionist 
neighbors. This comparison revealed 
that states' homicide rates are indiffer-
ent to the presence or absence of capi-
tal punishment statutes (Schuessler, 
1952). Further, when the risk of execu-
tion in capital punishment states was 
compared. with homicide rates, no 
significant relationship was found "be-
tween a large number of executions, 
small number of executions, continu-
ous executions, no executions, and 
what happens to the homicide rate" 
(Sellin, 1961, 71 ). 
In sum, it has generally been con-
cluded from studies of capital punish-
ment and homicide that the death 
penalty is ineffective in deterring this 
offense; and, further, that punishment 
in general is ineffective in deterring 
all offenses. Gibbs (1968) and Van 
den Haag (1968) take issue with both 
of these conclusions. First, most in-
vestigations of homicide and capital 
punishment have been quite limited 
in scope. Essential aspects of deter-
rence theory have been ignored in 
these investigations. For example, fun-
damental to deterrence theory is the 
celerity of punishment, although em-
pirical examination of this factor is 
completely absent in the literature. Sec-
ond, past studies of deterrence have 
typically focused upon one offense-
homicide-and one form of punish-
ment-the death penalty. These studies 
tell us little if anything about the 
deterrent properties of other forms of 
punishment and other offenses. Ob-
viously, general conclusions are not 
warranted at this time (Zimring and 
Hawkins, 1973). 
Recent investigations have broad-
ened the base of empirical evidence 
on deterrence. Gibbs (1968) examined 
the relationship between the severity 
and certainty of punishment and 
homicide rates for the states of this 
country. He hypothesized that the 
more certain and severe the penalties 
for homicide in a state, the lower 
the state's homicide rate would be. 
Estimates of the severity and certainty 
of punishment and offense rates were 
constructed from official police and 
prisoner statistics. 3 Examination of 
these data revealed the relationship 
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between severity and certainty of 
punishment and offense rates to be 
in the hypothesized inverse direction 
(<{> = .25 and <f> = -.48, respectively), 
with the larger coefficient between 
certainty and rate "entirely consistent 
with the position taken by practically 
every advocate of deterrence theory" 
(Gibbs, 1968, 525). In addition, Gibbs 
also concludes that the combined ef-
fects of the severity and certainty of 
punishment are additive in their ef-
fect on rates as deterrence theory 
would predict. 
A re-analysis of Gibbs's (1968) data 
by Gray and Martin (1969) using a 
more sophisticated statistical design 
has led to some modifications of 
Gibbs's findings. These researchers 
examined Gibbs's data in its original 
ratio scale form rather than simply 
treating it as nominal as had Gibbs. 
They 'further examined these data by 
means of both a rectilinear and log-
arithmic statistical model. The latter 
correlation model was utilized be-
cause some nonlinearity was apparent 
in the data, and the power function 
has the theoretical advantage of never 
predicting negative crime rates, while 
this is possible with a rectilinear 
model. 
Using a rectilinear model, Gray and 
Martin found the correlation between 
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the severity and certainty of punish-
ment and homicide rate to be in the 
hypothesized inverse direction (r = 
-.367 and r = -.281, respectively). 
The corresponding log correlations 
were also of a negative sign and some-
what larger (r = -.506 and r = -.379, 
respectively). Where Gibbs found cer-
tainty of punishment to be the more 
important factor, Gray and Martin 
found the inverse to be true. Further, 
a multiple correlation combining the 
effects of the severity and certainty of 
punishment on offense rates yielded 
correlations (R = .442 for the linear 
model, and R = -.599 for the log-
arithmic model) only slightly larger 
than the respective largest zero order 
correlations, thus only allowing an 
increment in explained variation of 
approximately .6 per cent and .9 per 
cent, respectively. In sum, contrary to 
Gibbs's (I 968) assertion, the severity 
and certainty of punishment do not 
appear to be additive in ·their effect on 
homicide. 
Tittle's (1969) deterrence investi-
gation resembles quite closely the ap-
proach taken by Gibbs (1968). Utiliz-
ing police and prisoner statistics, he 
examined the relationship between the 
certainty and severity of punishment 
and offense rates for seven major fel-
onies.4 The correlation between esti-
3. Gibbs operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the number of persons in 
each state sent to prison for homicide in 1960, divided by the total number of homicides 
reported to the police in that state for 1959-1960. The severity of punishment was opera-
tionalized as "the median number of months served on a homicide sentence by all persons 
in prisons on December 31, 1960." The dependent variable was defined as the average annual 
homicide rate per one hundred thousand population for each state from 1959-1961. The 
average homicide rate for a three-year period was used to allow for sufficient time for the 
deterrent effect and to provide greater stability to the rate. 
4. Tittle operationally defined the certainty of punishment as the average number of ad-
missions to prison for each of the index offenses in each state, from 1959 to 1962, divided by 
the number of index offenses known to the police in each state, from 1958 to 1962. The 
severity of punishment was operationalized as the mean number of months spent in prison 
by index crime offenders released in 1960. Tittle's "Deviance Index" consisted of the mean 
annual number of index offenses reported to the police in each state per 100,000 population 
from 1959 to 1963. 
CRIME AND DETERRENCE
128 
mates of the certainty of punishment 
and offense rates for all seven offenses 
combined was found to be in the 
predicted direction (Tau c = -.45). 
For the individual offenses the coef-
ficients are: sex offenses= -.17; assault 
= -.46; larceny = -.37; robbery = 
-.36; burglary = -.31; homicide = 
-.17; and auto theft = -.08. Like the 
total crime index, each of these co-
efficients is in the hypothesized direc-
tion, and with the exception of those 
for homicide and auto theft, are 
highly significant (P<.OI ). 
The relationship between the sev-
erity of punishment and offense rates 
for all offenses combined was found 
to be Tau c = .14. For the individual 
offenses the correlations are: sex of-
fenses = .26; assault = .18; larceny = 
.14; robbery = .05; burglary = .14; 
homicide = .45; and auto theft= .04. 
With the exception of homicide these 
findings are quite contrary to what 
deterrence theory would predict. 
In a recent investigation, Chiricos 
and Waldo (1970) provide a further 
examination of the hypothesis that 
rates of crime are inversely related to 
the certainty and severity of punish-
ment. Like Tittle (1969), they ex-
amine the deterrence hypothesis for 
each of the major index crimes, but 
for three points in time.~ Further, 
they examine the relationship between 
changes in the level of the certainty 
and severity of punishment and their 
effect on offense rates.6 As in Gibbs's 
(1968) and Tittle's (1969) investiga-
tions, official police and prisoner sta-
tistics were used to construct punish-
ment and rate indexes. 
Examination of the certainty-rate 
data revealed that all but one cor-
relation was in the hypothesized nega-
tive direction. The strength and level 
of significance of the associations 
varied greatly by offense and over 
time, however. Only for assault were 
the two variables consistently and 
significantly related for all three years. 
For burglary, the relationships were 
found to be statistically significant 
for two years, while the remaining cor-
relations were either low or not con-
sistent by offense. 
The severity-rate data also provided 
no consistent support for the deter-
rence hypothesis. With one exception 
(homicide, 1960), all correlations were 
either positive or low negative. More-
over, little consistency over time was 
exhibited within offense categories. 
Examination of changes in the levels 
of the severity and certainty of punish-
ment and their effect on offense rates 
5. Chiricos and Waldo's operationalization of the certainty and severity of punishment 
is as follows: 
19XX certainty = 19XX Admissions to Prison for "X" Offenses 
Mean of "X" Crimes Known to Police in 19XX and 19XX 
19XX severity= Median Length of Sentence Served by State Prisoners Released in 19XX 
Crime rates were calculated on the basis of three year averages: mean of 1950, 1951, and 1952 
rates; mean of 1960, 1961, and 1962 rates; and mean of 1963, 1964, and 1965 rates. 
6. Chiricos and Waldo calculated changes in the levels of the severity, certainty, and offense 
rates as follows: 
19XX-19YY % Change in Certainty = (19YY certainty) -(19XX certainty) 
19XX certainty 
19XX-19YY % Change in Severity = (19YY severity)- (19XX severity) 
19XX severity 
19XX-19YY % Change in Rate = (19YY rate)- (19XX rate) 
19XX rate 
CRIME AND DETERRENCE
also produced inconsistent findings. 
Only approximately 4 per cent of 
the certainty-rate correlations were in 
the hypothesized direction and statis-
tically significant, while none of the 
severity-rate correlations was as hypo-
thesized and statistically significant. 
Chiricos and Waldo conclude that 
their data provide little evidence of 
deterrence. 7 
In a final investigation of note, 
Ehrlich ( 1972) also examines the hy-
pothesis of a negative relationship be-
tween the severity and certainty of 
punishment and offense rates for the 
major index crimes for 1940, 1950, and 
1960. Using punishment and rate in-
dexes quite similar to those of the 
above investigators, he reports a con-
sistent negative correlation (r) be-
tween severity and rate, averaging 
(1940-1960) as follows for each offense: 
robbery = -.325; burglary = -.546; 
larceny= -.287; auto theft= -.174; 
murder = -.214; rape = -1.88; as-
sault = -.389.8 Similarly, the associa-
tion between certainty and rate was 
also found to be consistently in the 
hypothesized direction with coefficients 
averaging: robbery = -.913; burglary 
= -.468; larceny = -.298; auto theft 
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= -.247; murder = -.466; rape = 
-.578; assault = - .393. 
In addition, Ehrlich also reports 
that. when median family income, per-
centage of families below one half of 
the median family income, and per-
centage nonwhite are introduced as 
control variables (all three factors are 
described by Ehrlich as "major theo-
retical determinants of criminal ac-
tivity"), the relationship between pun-
ishment and rate remains generally 
unchanged.9 
In spite of the shortcomings of po-
lice and prisoner statistics used to 
construct his punishment and rate in-
dexes and the somewhat stringent eco-
nometric specification of functional 
relationships required in the regres-
sion model used, Ehrlich (1972, 275) 
concludes that his data are "consistent 
with the hypothesis that law-enforce-
ment activity has a deterrent effect on 
offenders." Furthermore, the fact that 
coefficients for crimes against persons 
are not on the average lower than for 
crimes against property suggests that 
contrary to common belief, "law-en-
forcement activity may not be less 
effective in combating crimes of hate 
7. Chiricos and Waldo are reluctant, however, to suggest that the severity and certainty 
of punishment fail to deter crime. Rather, they question whether deterrence may be adequately 
addressed through the use of police and prisoner statistics. 
8. Ehrlich operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the number of persons 
sent to prison in each state for each of the index crimes (1940, 1950, 1960), divided by the 
number of index crimes reported to the police for these years. It is not clear whether Ehrlich 
uses 'the mean or median length of sentence served by released felons as his measure of 
severity, for he fails to reference the source of his prisoner data. He simply describes his 
severity measure as the "average" length of prison sentence. 
9. Although Ehrlich should be commended for introducing these three socio-economic vari-
ables into his investigation, it is unclear from his analysis how each of these factors in-
dividually, or in combination, affects the relationship between the severity and certainty of 
punishment and offense rates. Unfortunately, he solely reports overall partial coefficients 
between his punishment and rate variables, combining the effects of all three socio-economic 
factors. A much more comprehensive picture might have been revealed had he reported 
(a) zero order correlations between each of the independent variables and rate. (b) partial 
coefficients between the punishment variables and rate, controlling for each socio-economic 
factor, and (c) overall partial correlations between the independent and dependent variables, 
controlling for the combined effect of all three socio-economic factors. 
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and passion than crimes involving ma-
terial gain" (274). 
It is of interest to note the dissimi-
larity of Gibbs (1968), Gray and Mar-
tin (1969), Tittle (1969), Chiricos 
and Waldo (1970), and Ehrlich's 
(1972) findings on the question of 
deterrence. These differences provide 
a particular mystery considering the 
similarity of the researcher's opera-
tionalizations of their punishment and 
rate variables, and the time periods 
examined. Clearly, further investiga-
tion would appear warranted. 
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION 
The research reported here is a 
further examination of the relation-
ship between the severity and certain-
ty of punishment and offense rates. 
Our approach is similar to that of 
Gibbs (1968), Tittle (1969), Chiricos 
and Waldo (1970), and Ehrlich (1972), 
with the following additions: first, po-
lice and prisoner data are examined 
in their original ratio scale form, and 
not simply dichotomized or tricho-
tomized with a resulting loss in the 
precision of the data. Second, the ques-
tion of the additive effects of the 
severity and certainty of punishment 
on offense rates are examined for eight 
index offenses. Third, the relationship 
between the severity, cevtainty, and 
offense rate variables are examined 
by way of both a rectilinear and log-
arithmic statistical model for all 
eight index crimes.10 Lastly, each of 
the above relationships is examined 
over three points in time-1950, 1960, 
and 1964. 
In line with deterrence theory the 
following hypotheses are advanced: 
1. A substantial negative correla-
tion exists between states' offense rates 
and the severity of punishment for 
each of the index offenses. 
2. A substantial negative correla-
tion exists between states' offense rates 
and the certainty of punishment for 
each of the index off.enses. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
In order to examine the above re-
lationships, indexes were constructed 
for the severity, certainty, and offense 
rate variables. A discussion of these 
indexes, the population under investi-
gation, and the data ga-thering and 
processing techniques used follow. 
The Population 
The population for this investiga-
tion consists of the states of the United 
States. It was not possible, however, to 
secure complete population data for 
the three time periods chosen. For 
1950, Michigan and Georgia failed to 
report the prisoner data needed for 
the severity11 and certainty12 indexes. 
10. A discussion of the rectilinear and log statistical models will follow later in this paper. 
ll. Severity data were gathered from the following sources: 
1951 "National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners Released from State and Federal Institutions, 
1951." Washington, D.C.: 24-27. 
1960 "National Prisoner Statistics: Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960." Washington, D.C.: 
69. 
1964 "National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1964." Wash-
ington, D.C.: 52. 
12. Police and prisoner statistics were used to construct the certainty of punishment measure. 
The sources of these data are as follows: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
1950 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1950." Washington, D.C.: 78-82. 
1960 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1960." Washington, D.C. 34-37. 
1964 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1964." Washington, D.C.: 50-53. 
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For 1960, New Jersey failed to report 
the needed data, as did New Jersey 
and Alaska for 1964. This left a total 
of 46 states for 1950, 47 states for 1960, 
and 48 states for 1964. It is not pos-
sible at this time to say why these 
prisoner data were not available for 
the states and years mentioned. These 
states are simply excluded from tables 
reporting such data with a note stat-
ing, for example, "Excludes statistics 
for Georgia and Michigan." Repeated 
inquiries to the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons about this matter have re-
sulted in no explanation. 
Measures 
The Certainty of Punishment.-
The certainty-of-punishment measure 
used consists of the number of ad-
missions to state prisons for each of 
the index offenses divided by the num-
ber of such crimes reported to the 
police. This measure produced a cer-
tainty of punishment value for each 
offense for the states and years desig-
nated above. This measure would ap-
pear as follows for the three time 
periods designated: 
Certainty 
# admissions to prison for offense "X" 
# of "X" crimes reported t0 the police 
Official police and prisoner statistics 
were used in the construction of this 
measure.l3 
The above equation yields a cer· 
tainty of punishment value which can 
range theoretically from zero to one. 
A value of zero would indicate that no 
Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Ul 
one was convicted and imprisoned for 
the offense in question, while a value 
of one would suggest that an equal 
number of convictions and offenses 
were reported. It should be kept clear-
ly in mind that certainty estimates 
cannot be interpreted as the propor-
tion of offenders who are convicted 
and imprisoned. Such data on individ-
ual offenders, while preferable, are 
simply not available. 
A second difficulty with this measure 
was discovered when comparing num-
ber of prison admissions for various 
offenses with the number of such of-
fenses reported to the police. In some 
instances, it was found that there were 
more admissions to prison for an of-
fense than there were such offenses 
reported. That is, the numerator of 
our certainty index was found to be 
larger than the denominator, thus 
yielding a certainty value greater than 
unity. This situation could have oc-
curred as a result of: (1) police de-
partments in the states in question 
underreporting the number of such 
offenses; (2) prison authorities in-
accurately reporting the number of 
prison admissions for these offenses; 
(3) plea bargaining (persons being 
imprisoned for offenses other than 
those reported by the police); (4) im-
prisonment of persons whose offenses 
were committed and reported during 
a previous year; or (5) any combina-
tion of these. In the 30 cases where 
this situation occurred (1950 = 20, 
1960 = 10, 1964 = 0) a certainty value 
of .9999 was assigned. 
1950 "National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, 1950.'" Wash· 
ington, D.C.: 72-73. 
1960 "National Prisoner Statistics: Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960.'' Washington, D.C." 
16-18. 
1964 "'National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1964." Wash· 
ington. D.C.: 17. 
13. The sources of these data are reported in note 12 supra. 
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As indicated earlier, data were not 
available for all states for some years. 
In addition, complete prisoner data 
were also not available for all states 
for all offenses included in the an-
alysis. In the tables where missing 
prisoner data would normally be re-
ported, one finds a dash (-).14 It is 
not clear what this dash means, for 
there are no footnotes describing this 
symbol. The same symbol appears else-
where in Bureau of Prisons publica-
tions where frequencies are too small 
(n< 10 or 12) to compute meaningful 
averages. In the tables being consid-
ered here, however, we are dealing 
with frequencies, and a small n size is 
not a consideration. It would thus 
appear that the dash (-) is used to 
symbolize either (1) that no persons 
were sent to prison in these states for 
these offenses (a zero frequency), or 
(2) that no data were reported by 
these states on prison admissions for 
these offenses and years. The first ex-
planation seems more plausible, for 
no zero frequencies are reported in 
these data. Inquiry of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons as to the meaning of 
this symbol (-) has received no satis-
factory response to date. Consequent-
ly, 25 state-by-offense categories (13 
for 1950, 8 for 1960, and 4 for 1964) 
were omitted from the analysis. 
A further difficulty with these data 
centers in the problem of compara-
bility of offense categories. The index 
offenses examined for 1950 include 
murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, 
larceny, auto theft, burglary, and ag-
gravated assault. Prisoner data for 
1950 are comparable. For 1960 and 
1964, however, no prisoner data are 
reported for manslaughter or rape. 
Consequently, these offenses were 
omitted from the 1960 and 1964 an-
alyses.u; 
Three additional limitations of our 
certainty measure should also be brief-
ly noted. First, this measure is narrow 
in scope. It refers solely to the cer-
tainty of imprisonment, ignoring oth-
er types of penalties. It should also be 
kept in mind, however, that each of 
the offenses considered here is a ma-
jor felony, generally punishable by 
at least one year in prison. Secondly, 
our measure does not take into ac-
count the commission of multiple of-
fenses by persons (Tittle, 1969) or 
problems associated with "plea bar-
gaining." 
Third, because of delays between 
arrest and trial, many persons ar-
rested for an offense during any given 
year may not be imprisoned (if con-
victed) until the following year. To 
control for this time lag factor, it 
would seem advisable to either (a) 
compare offense rates for 1950, 1960, 
and 1964 (the denominator of the 
certainty index) with prison admis-
14. This symbol appears for the following offenses by year: 
1950 manslaughter (3), auto theft (8), rape (2) 
1960 auto theft (8) 
1964 auto theft (8), larceny (I) 
15. In addition, data from the Uniform Crime Reports for 1960 and 1964 exclude criminally 
negligent manslaughter. This offense, however, is evidently included in prisoner homicide 
data for these two years. Further, the assault categories for the prisoner and offense rate data 
are not completely comparable. For 1960 and 1964, this offense was categorized for the prisoner 
data as "assault." Offense rate data are available only for "aggravated assault" for these years. 
Despite this discrepancy, this offense was left in the analysis. "Assault" data were used in the 
numerator of our certainty equation, while "aggravated assault" data were used in the de-
nominator. This would have the effect of escalating certainty values for this offense. This 
would be a constant factor, however, for all states. 
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sion figures for the following years, 
1951, 1961, and 1965 (the numerator 
of the certainty index) or (b) average 
prison admission figures for 1950-51, 
1960-61, and 1964-65 for the numerator 
of our measure. In the absence of 
comparable prison admission figures 
for 1951, 1961, and 1965, however, 
neither adjustment is possible. Ac-
cordingly, it must be assumed that the 
carry-over of cases from year to year 
between arrest and imprisonment is 
a constant factor, thus not substan-
tially biasing our certainty index.16 
While it does suffer from the dif-
ficulties indicated, the certainty index 
does reflect, although with error, the 
relative certainty of punishment in 
different states. Assuming the error 
to be random relative to crime rates, 
such error will only serve to attentuate 
any "genuine" correlation between 
certainty and rate. 
The Severity of Punishment.-Sev-
erity of punishment is operationally 
defined here as the median number 
of months served in prison by released 
felons. These data were obtained from 
statistics published by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons for 1951, 1960, and 
1964. This measure differs from that 
used by Tittle (1969), who used the 
mean length of sentence served (in 
months) rather than the median. It 
also differs from that used by Gibbs 
(1968), who used the median number 
of months served by felony prisoners 
as of December 31, 1960.17 The me-
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dian was used here because data com-
parable to either Gibbs's or Tittle's 
were not available for all three time 
periods. 
Like the certainty of punishment 
data discussed above, statistics on the 
severity of punishment were also found 
to be incomplete.18 First, severity fig-
ures (median length of sentence) were 
not available for 1950. Apparently, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons did not 
request these data from the states that 
year. Severity data were compiled for 
1951, however. These data were used 
as an estimate of 1950 severity. It was 
felt that these figures would provide 
an adequate estimate for the former 
year. Further, it was believed impor-
tant to examine the severity-rate rela-
tionship over three rather than just 
two points in time (1960 and 1964). 
Second, like the certainty data, pub-
lished severity statistics are incom-
plete. For 1951, 17 severity figures are 
not reported. This resulted from the 
fact that no prisoners were released 
from prison in some states for these 
offenses in 1951. Data were also miss-
ing for 1960 and 1964, when the 
median length of sentence was not 
reported for offense categories where 
fewer than ten persons were released. 
For 1960 and 1964 this amounted to 
31 and 36 missing cases, respectively.19 
It was not possible to secure compar-
able severity data for 1959 or 1961, or 
for 1963 or 1965, to calculate estimates 
for these missing cases. 20 
I6. For a discussion of two alternative measures of certainty ("clearance rate" and "arrest 
rate") and the problems associated with each, see Zimring and Hawkins (1973, 330-335). 
I7. See note 8 supra for a discussion of Ehrlich's severity index. 
I8. See note II supra for the source of these data. 
I9. Data were missing for the following offenses by year: 
1960 homicide (9) , robbery (4) , assault (7) , larceny (4) , auto theft (7) 
1964 homicide (11), robbery (4), assault (7), auto theft (14) 
20. In addition, exact severity figures were not provided for offenses whose median severity 
was over 180 months. These included 1960 homicide (2); 1964 homicide (8), robbery (3). 
These offenses were assigned a value of 180 months. 
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One final possible difficulty with 
our severity of punishment measure 
concerns the question of how well the 
average length of prison sentence 
served by released felons in 1951, 1960, 
and 1964 reflects the courts' sentencing 
practices for these years? That is, do 
these figures provide a good indicator 
of the length of prison sentence a felon 
might expect if convicted during these 
years? Unfortunately, in the absence 
of adequate court statistics it is not 
possible to directly test this question. 21 
Inspection of figures in Table 1, how-
ever, indicates th<l't with the exception 
of one offense (homicide), sentencing 
practices were relatively constant for 
the 14-year period considered here. 
Again, unfortunately, comparable pris-
oner statistics for more recent years 
(after 1964) are not available to test 
whether this trend has continued. 
TABLE I 
MEDIAN LENGTH OF PRISON SENTENCE 
(MoNTHS) SERVED BY RELEASED fELONS, BY 
YEAR AND OFFENSE 
Offt!nse 19>.1 1960 1964 
Murder ~nd Nonnt!g-
ligent H~n3hughter 97 52 49 
Robbery .33 .31.: 36 
hsau1t 2? 20 21 
furghry ?2 20 ?0 
L~rceny 17 17 17 
}uto Tht!ft 20 19 18 
~ource: See note 11. 
Crime Rate: The Dependent Vari-
able.-The dependent variable of this 
investigation consists of each state's 
crime rates for the offenses and years 
specified above. Crime rate is here 
defined as the number of offenses re-
ported to the police per 100,000 popu-
lation. These data were obtained from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Uniform Crime Reports for 1950, 1960, 
and 1964.22 Rate figures were avail-
able for all states for each of the of-
fenses and years selected. 
Rate data were gathered for all 
three time periods for homicide, rob-
bery, burglary, assault, larceny, and 
auto theft. In addition, for 1950, fig-
ures were also gathered for rape and 
manslaughter. Comparable severity 
and certainty data were not available 
for these two offenses for 1960 and 
1964, however. 
Although FBI statistics have pro-
vided the most commonly used source 
of data in deterrence investigations, 
they are not without their faults. Most 
notable of these concern problems of 
incompleteness and comparability of 
offense categories. At the one extreme, 
there are those who view these diffi-
culties as so serious as to preclude 
their use in criminological investiga-
tions (Ahem, 1971). Most students of 
crime, however, argue that the data 
may not be good, but they are the best 
we have for many purposes and may 
be used very profitably if one keeps in 
mind their limitations. For an ex-
cellent discussion and critique of the 
Uniform Crime Reports, see Wolf-
gang, 1958, 1963; Beattie, 1960; Chil-
ton, 1966; Lejins, 1966.23 
21. The latest figures (1970) issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons on released felons 
cover only 33 of the 50 states. Furthermore, the form of the data reported does not permit 
calculation of the median (or mean) length of sentence served in each state for each of the 
major felonies (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1970, 45-56) . 
22. For the source of these offense rate data, see note 12 supra. 
23. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of police statistics in conducting deter-
rence research, see Ehrlich (1972) and Zimring and Hawkins (1973). 
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Data Processing and Analysis 
The measures of association used 
in this analysis are the Pearson prod-
uct moment correlation (r) and mul-
tiple R. The only assumption neces-
·sary to use these measures is that one's 
data reach at least an interval level 
of measurement. This assumption 
would appear warranted for our data. 
Tittle (1969), Gibbs (1968), and 
Waldo (1970) were not (apparently) 
willing to assume their data were of 
an interval level of measurement. 
Gibbs, as we recall, utilized a conven-
tional cp analysis, dichotomizing his 
data at the median. He felt his data 
did not meet the assumption of nor-
mality. Gray and Martin (1969) point 
out that this assumption is not re-
quired in order to use r or R as a 
measure of association, but only if 
one is interested in using tests of signi-
ficance in order to make a population 
inference. Gibbs's data, as we recall, 
were for all practical purposes popu-
lation data. Some might argue that the 
possible unreliability of police statis-
tics does not allow an interval level 
of measurement to be assumed. The 
possible unreliability of police data is 
not negated by reducing one's level 
of measurement, however. In short, 
the type of statistical design used by 
Gibbs (1968), Tittle (1969), and Chi-
ricos and Waldo (1970) results in a 
substantial loss in the precision of the 
punishment and rate data.24 
Alternative Models and 
Decision-making 
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Gray and Martin (1969) found 
that a power function relating severity 
and certainty of punishment best ex-
plained Gibbs's (1968) homicide data. 
The usual model in a correlation an-
alysis of this kind is of the form Y = 
A + Bx. Both a rectilinear and curvi-
linear correlation model will be ex-
amined here, for a single instance in 
which the power function proves su-
perior may be atypical. 
The power function is expressed by 
taking the logarithms of all three 
variables and computing the conven-
tional Pearson product-moment cor-
relation coefficients. The rectilinear 
model is expressed by computing the 
same correlation coefficients with the 
raw data. The model with the higher 
r value has the better fit for a particu-
lar set of data; that is, the rectilinear 
model is the model of better fit if the 
raw data produce higher coefficients 
than the logarithmic data, while the 
power function is the model of better 
fit if the reverse occurs. 2'5 
For various reasons conventional 
"tests of statistical significance" are 
not appropriate for these correlation 
coefficients. Important assumptions re-
quired by the tests-most notably, in-
dependent random sampling-cannot 
be met.26 Consequently, we have ar-
bitrarily chosen to regard as "large" 
any coefficient whose absolute value 
24. The statistical design used here has the further advantage over that used by Gibbs and 
Tit·tle of being able to examine the simultaneous relationship between three or more variables, 
interaction among variables, and the form of the relationship between variables. 
25. In much correlation analysis in criminology it is uncritically assumed that the form of 
the relationship between independent and dependent variables is linear and can best be 
described with a straight regression line. Unfortunately this "rule of thumb" of linearity has 
caused investigators to overlook the possible usefulness of alternative correlation models. 
Recently, however, the linearity of relationships between punishment and rate variables in 
deterrence research has been seriously questioned, with alternative (curvilinear) correlation 
models being used quite profitably (Gray and Martin [1969], Bailey and Smith [1972]). For a 
discussion of linear and nonlinear relationships in correlation analysis see any introductory 
statistics text. 
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exceeds .500 and as "moderate" any 
coefficient between .400 and .500. Cor-
relations whose value falls below .400 
will arbitrarily be called "low." 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports index correlations 
between punishment variables and 
crime rates. These correlations are 
based on the assumption that the as-
sociation between the variables is rec-
tilinear in form. 
TABLE 2 
INDEX CoRRELATIONS BETWEEN PUNISHMENT 
VARIABLES AND SELECTED OFFENSE RATES, 
BY YEAR 
Punishm<>nt Product Moment Correlations 
Offen~..£ Vari.:tble .illQ_ .!J_§_Q_ 19C·4 
Severity -.396 -.332 -.165 
Homicide Certainty .120 -.366 -. 228 
J.'fultiple .402 .450 0 288 
Severity -.125 -.112 -.068 
Robbery Certainty -.446 -.471 -.338 
Multiple .487 .480 .372 
Severity .017 .150 .087 
Assault Certainty -.365 -.370 -.401 
Hultiple .374 .370 .415 
Severity -.040 .158 0 271 
Burglary Certainty -.121 -.448 -.527 
Multiple .148 .449 .529 
Severity -.041 .191 .105 
Theft Certainty -.247 -.377 -.450 
Multiple . 261 .379 .459 
Severity -.086 . 295 .194 
Auto Tbcft Ccrtcdnty -. 251 -.378 -.528 
Multiple .262 .426 .532 
Man- Severity -.144 
slaughter Certainty -.153 
Multiple .213 
Severity -.006 
Rape Certainty -.654 
Multi-ple .654 
We find that of the 40 correlations 
presented, 27 three are large correla-
tions and five are moderate correla-
tions, for a total of eight correlations 
which meet our criteria for further at-
tention. All are negative, and all in-
volve certainty. The probability of all 
eight correlations having the same 
sign (under the null hypothesis that 
positive and negative correlations are 
equally likely) is equal to 2(2·8), or 
.008, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. 
One additional coefficient, involv-
ing severity and homicide for 1950, 
just meets our criterion for "moderate 
correlation" when rounded to two 
digits. The largest positive correlation 
(between severity and auto theft for 
TABLE 3 
LOG. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PUNISHMENT 
VARIABLES AND SELECTED OFFENSE RATES, 
BY YEAR 
Homicide 
Robbery 
Assault 
Burglary 
Theft 
Auto Theft 
M..1.n-
slaughter 
RapP 
Punislunent 
V.c~riE:.'t!.£_ 
Severity 
Certainty 
Multiple 
Severity 
Certainty 
Hultiple 
Severity 
Certainty 
Multiple 
Severity 
Certainty 
?-lultiplc 
Severity 
Certainty 
Nulliple 
Severity 
Certainty 
Multiple 
Severity 
Certainty 
}lultiple 
Sevcl"ity 
Certainty 
Multiple 
Product-~1anl'!nt C'orr~l"tion:!!l 
of Lop;11ri t.hm!!! 
_llli_ ...lliQ_ ~ 
-.044 -.415 -.009 
.042 -.349 -.311 
.058 
-' 530 -.325 
.002 .020 .122 
-. 507 -.499 -.639 
• 535 .500 .687 
.070 .333 .308 
-.649 -. 704 -.615 
.687 .718 0 6~8 
-,094 .223 0 291 
.000 -.460 -.524 
.102 .460 .5'25 
.118 .114 .108 
-.156 -.406 -.417 
.181 .418 .424 
.158 .191 .113 
-.051 -.490 -.650 
.198 .490 .651 
-.025 
-.119 
.124 
.080 
-. 596 
.601 
26. Even though it is a common practice to use statistical tests of significance for "heuristic 
value" even when their assumptions cannot be met, they will not be used here for two reasons: 
(1) as noted above, for some years and offenses complete population data were not available, 
and (2) the years selected for this analysis were not drawn on a probability basis, but rather 
are the only years when reasonably complete data are available. Accordingly, population in-
ferences become highly questionable. 
27. The multiple correlations, being dependent on 
are not counted in comparing frequencies of positive 
hypotheses of chance association. 
the severity and certainty correlations, 
and negative correlations or in testing 
. 
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1960) is .295; while 14 negative cor-
relations are of a larger absolute value. 
Table 3 reports log correlations be-
tween punishment variables and crime 
rates. These correlations are based on 
the assumption that the association 
between the variables takes the form 
of a power function. 
.Of the 40 correlations in Table 3, 
eight are large and six are of moderate 
size, for a total of 14 correlations 
which meet our criteria of importance. 
All are negative; one involving sev-
erity and 13 involving certainty. The 
probability of all 4 correlations hav-
ing the same sign (if positive and 
negative correlations are equally as 
likely) is equal to 2(2-14), or .0001, 
thus rejecting the null hypothesis. 
DISCUSSION 
It seems clear from the overwhelm-
ing negative trend of the larger cor-
relations that these data give evidence 
of deterrence. These results are con-
sistent with those of Tittle (1969), 
Gibbs (1968), Gray and Martin (1969), 
and Ehrlich (1972), who also report a 
substantial inverse relationship be-
tween their certainty and rate indexes. 
They are not consistent with the con-
clusions of Chiricos and Waldo (1971), 
however. Some possible reasons for the 
discrepancy between Chiricos and 
Waldo's findings and others have been 
discussed elsewhere (Bailey et al., 
1972). It remains for us to examine 
the problem of "spuriousness" com-
monly discussed in the literature, the 
question of the form of relationship 
between crime rates and the punish-
ment variables, and the additivity of 
effect of the punishment variables. 
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The "Spuriousness Issue" 
Since all but one of our large and 
moderate correlations involve certain-
ty, it may be appropriate to ask whe-
ther they are artifacts of a common-
factor situation mentioned by Tittle 
(1969) and emphasized by Chiricos 
and Waldo (1971). The factor crimes 
known to the police (hereinafter, C) 
is the denominator of the certainty 
ratio and the numerator of crime rate. 
If we represent the situation algebrai-
cally, we have: 
. I C 
Certamty = C and Crime rate = p 
where I is the number of imprison-
ments and P is the population size. If 
I, C, and P are independent, increases 
in C will increase Crime Rate and de-
crease Certainty, while decreases in C 
will do the reverse. Accidental fluctua-
tions in C will thus tend to drive the 
Certainty-Rate correlation in a nega-
tive direction. 
This problem is especially severe for 
Chiricos and Waldo (1971) for rea-
sons based on their methodology. This 
point has been discussed in detail 
elsewhere (Bailey et al., 1972). It will 
suffice for present purposes to say that 
when product-moment correlation (r) 
is used, the spurious "negative pres-
sure" is relatively modest. The best 
available estimate of this pressure is 
probably Tittle's r of -.07 (r2 = .005), 
which was computed from 1,000 cases 
of random data, and because of this 
large n is unlikely to be far off the 
mark.28 Because product-moment cor-
relation capitalizes on chance, the pres-
sure may be a bit greater for our n of 
35-45, but the difference will be 
28. If anything, Tittle's value would appear to be farther from zero than the true value. 
His "data" were strictly random, while C, I, and P are actually interrelated; for an extreme 
example, I cannot exceed P and C is very unlikely to. 
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slight.29 Accordingly, "negative pres-
sure" seems unlikely to be responsible 
for these results. 
The Model of Choice 
A special concern in this investiga-
tion is the question of the form of the 
relationship between punishment vari-
ables and crime rates. The conven-
tional rectilinear form is represented 
in Table 2, while the power function 
suggested by Gray and Martin (1969) 
is represented in Table 3. A compari-
son of these tables provides an answer 
to the question of which model better 
fits the data. 
In ll of the 14 cases where one or 
both of the tables show a correlation 
of moderate or large size, the larger 
coefficient is found in Table 3. In 
three cases, the larger coefficient is 
found in Table 2.30 Under the null 
hypothesis that the larger coefficient 
is equally likely to be found in Table 
2 or Table 3 (both .5), the binomial 
probability of an outcome this evenly 
divided, with direction predicted, is 
I + 14 + 91 + 364 470 
214 16384 = '029 
That is, the null hypothesis may be 
rejected, indicating that the power 
function better fits the data. 
The power function has attractive 
features apart from its greater ability 
to account for the variation in offense 
rates. Its predictions make intuitive 
sense in that it predicts proportional 
changes in crime rates from propor-
tional changes in punishment vari-
ables and does not predict such ab-
surdities as negative crime rates. Pow-
er functions have also been asserted 
to be the established form for psy-
chophysical relationships (Stevens, 
1970) and there is some intuitive har-
mony in their also being appropriate 
for the social psychology of deterrence. 
At the same time, we should recognize 
that a large number of other classes 
of functions remain unexplored.a1 
Additivity of Effect: Certainty 
and Severity 
Figures in Tables 2 and 3 give little 
evidence that the combined effects of 
the severity and certainty of punish-
ment provide a greater deterrent value 
than that of certainty alone. In each 
table, there are only I 0 instances in 
29. If one adds the r' associated with the largest positive correlation to the r' associated 
with Tittle's-.07, the sum is less than the r' associated with the smallest negative correlation. 
This holds even if one doubles the magnitude of Tittle's correlation (thus quadrupling the 
r") . For example, from Table 3: 
Largest positive correlation = .333 (r2 = .ll09) 
Double Tittle's correlation = -.14 (r2 = .0196) 
Sum of determination coefficients = .1305 
A similar result holds for Table 2. To the extent that the "negative pressure" is fairly repre· 
sented by a product-moment r as much as twice that reported by Tittle, it seems reasonable 
to proceed as we have done. 
For both index and log correlations, the smallest "moderate" correlation represents a co-
efficient of determination which exceeds the coefficient of determination associated with the 
largest positive correlation by more than the "spurious negative pressure." 
30. These three cases included one in which the values differed by .003; we considered 
regarding them as tied, but decided that the conservative procedure would be to include the 
case. 
31. For a discussion of the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between the severity 
and certainty of punishment and offense rates, see Zimring and Hawkins (1973), Andenaes 
(1966), and Bailey and Smith (1972). 
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which the combined effect of both 
punishment variables (R) exceeds the 
larger of the zero-order correlations by 
.01 or more. 32 That is, half the com-
parisons involve less than .01 differ-
ence between the larger zero-order cor-
relation and the multiple correlation. 
Of the four cases where the multiple 
correlation exceeds the larger of the 
zero-order correlations by .05 or more, 
all involve homicide; three (two in 
Table 2 and one in Table 3) involve 
murder, while one (in Table 2) in-
volves manslaughter. In all four cases 
both the severity-rate and certainty-
ra-te correlations are negative. The 
more frequent cases, where there is 
little difference between the larger 
zero-order correlation and the multiple 
correlation, typically involve a nega-
tive correlation between certainty and 
rate and a small positive correlation 
between severity and rate. 
We are thus inclined to conclude 
that the certainty of punishment has 
a dominant effect except for homicide 
and that the severity of punishment is 
related to crime rate largely as a result 
of its correlation with certainty. With 
modern indeterminate sentences, the 
offender may be relatively unable to 
guess the severity of his sentence until 
his sentence ends, for it may depend 
more on his behavior behind bars than 
on his offense. If this should be the 
case, severity could hardly figure im-
portantly in deterrence. Homicides, 
however, more often lead to long mini-
mum sentences, with authorities re-
luctant to release murderers soon after 
imprisonment. 
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Presence of Deterrence 
From the above, it seems clear that 
the dominant variable in deterrence 
(of those examined here) is certainty. 
The most common pattern in both 
Tables 2 and 3 involves a strong or 
moderate negative correlation between 
certainty and crime rate, a weak cor-
relation (usually positive) between 
severity and crime rate; and a multiple 
correlation between crime rate and 
the two punishment variables that is 
roughly equal to the larger zero-order 
correlation. Exceptions to this rule are 
more likely to involve a negative cor-
relation between severity and crime 
rate. The most striking of these excep-
tions involves homicide. 
It seems fair to conclude that both 
Gray and Martin (1969) and Tittle 
( 1969) are correct about the effect of 
severity. Severity has an important 
effect upon homicide, but for most 
crimes it is relatively unimportant. 
Homicide appears to be a case unto 
itself, which seems sociologically 
reasonable for homicide is structurally 
unlike other crimes.aa 
Homicide is directed at a particular 
victim and usually results from inter-
personal stress. The murderer is es-
pecially limited to one victim (while 
the thief may choose among many). 
The murderer may be seen as one who 
has "decided," however hastily, that 
the strain of tolera·ting a particular 
victim is worse than the risk of pun-
ishment. He cannot choose the victim 
or the jurisdiction least likely to re-
sult in imprisonment, as the thief and 
even the rapist can choose. It is there-
32. We refer, of course, to differences between absolute values. 
33. Rape is sometimes classed as similar to homicide, but follows roughly the "standard" 
pattern in these data. See, e.g., Ploscowe (1968) and Svalastoga (1962). The similiarities 
between aggravated assault and homicide have also been noted, but the assault data also 
follow roughly the "standard" pattern. See, e.g., Pittman and Handy (1964). 
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fore not surpnsmg that while other 
offenders may be deterred by the 
serious risk of imprisonment, the per-
son who kills is influenced by the 
severity of sentence at risk. 
SUMMARY 
A correlation analysis of the severity 
and certainty of punishment and of-
fense rates for the rna jor index crimes 
produced results consistent with the 
predictions of deterrence theory. 
There were, however, many instances 
in which the predicted evidence of 
deterrence was absent. We are thus 
inclined to regard these findings as 
possibly reflecting a multiplicity of 
political and legal differences in the 
handling of crime data and offenders 
which sometimes obscure the relation-
ship between the punishment and rate 
variables. 
Our results indicate that certainty 
and not the severity of punishment is 
the chief deterrent for most crimes.34 
Homicide, however, is influenced by 
severity, possibly reflecting the differ-
ences between homicide and other 
offenses. Further, it appears that a 
power function better describes the 
relationship between the punishment 
variables and crime ra,tes than a 
rectilinear equation-a conclusion 
which, even apart from the data, 
appears more reasonable than the re-
verse. 
As noted above, the difficulties in 
using official police and prisoner data 
to study deterrence precisely are many. 
We are thus inclined to conclude that 
while research of the present kind is 
important in establishing that a 
process (deterrence) is occurring, its 
exact nature may be better addressed 
by an alternative methodological ap-
proach. Fundamental to deterrence 
theory is the notion that potential 
offenders' perceptions of the proba-
bility of detection and the punish-
ment that would result-no matter 
how mistaken-are the key mechan-
isms of deterrence. Accordingly, social 
psychological investigations of deter-
rence such as those suggested by lim-
ring and Hawkins (1968, 1973), 
Waldo and Chiricos (1972), Bailey 
et al., (1970), and Zimring (1971), 
focusing on how perceptions of the 
severity, certainty, and celerity of 
punishment relate to criminal be-
havior and how would-be offenders 
come to form perceptions of the 
probability and nature of punish-
ment, would seem particularly fruit-
ful. Research of this sort is currently 
under way by the present writers. 
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